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COMMENTS
SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE DUE PROCESS IN
PLEA BARGAINING
Plea bargains result from agreements by defendants to enter
guilty pleas in exchange for consideration from the prosecution.' If
the prosecution fails to perform its side of the bargain, then a court
may rely on principles of traditional contract law and grant specific
enforcement of the bargain. These courts usually require the
creation of a bargain, subsequent reliance on the agreement by the
defendant, and nonperformance by the prosecution before they will
enforce the agreement. 2
In Cooper v. United States,3 however, the Fourth Circuit moved
two steps beyond precedent by granting specific performance
although both agreement and reliance were absent.' The
defendant, convicted on two counts of bribing a witness and two
counts of obstruction of justice, appealed the district court's refusal
to compel performance of a plea bargain proposed to him through
his attorney I The Fourth Circuit held that the government's
1. Plea bargain, plea negotiation, and plea agreement all refer to an agreement between
prosecution and defendant or defense counsel whereby the defendant will plead guilty and
perhaps offer other help to the prosecution. The prosecution's consideration may include any
combination of the following: reducing the charges; dropping multiple counts; making sen-
tencing recommendations; and not seeking indictment for related crimes. See generally Al-
schuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059 (1976); Al-
schuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv.
1 (1975); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179
(1975); Gallagher, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Search for New Standards, 9
HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 29 (1974); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the
Criminal Process, 90 HARv. L. REv. 564 (1977).
2. See generally Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea
Bargains, 66 CAL F. L. REV. 471 (1978), which provides an exhaustive study and a persuasive
analysis. See also Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken
Promises, 11 Am. Crum. L. REV. 771 (1973); 51 N.C.L. REv. 602 (1973); 13 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 842 (1977).
3. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
4. Id. at 17 n.6.
5. On May 11, 1977, an Assistant United States Attorney met with Cooper's counsel to
discuss a plea agreement. The government attorney proposed that Cooper cooperate with the
government in the prosecution of narcotics trials in which Cooper was a chief witness and
then plead guilty to one count of obstruction of justice. In return, the government would
dismiss the other counts of Cooper's indictment and alert the sentencing judge to Cooper's
cooperation. This offer was unequivocal and relayed no further requirement of approval by
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withdrawal of the plea bargain proposal violated the constitutional
standard of fairness, and thus entitled Cooper to specific
performance of the proposed bargain.
The court drew no analogies to contract law, under which the
defendant could have shown neither a completed agreement nor
detrimental reliance on the promise. Instead, the court based its
decision on the defendant's rights to substantive due process
during plea negotiations and effective assistance of counsel, and
held that "a constitutional right to enforcement of plea proposals
may arise before any technical 'contract' has been formed, and on
the basis alone of expectations reasonably formed in reliance upon
the honor of the government in making and abiding by its
proposals." 6
Although Cooper represents an important extension of
procedural safeguards to the process of plea negotiation, the court's
reliance on concepts of substantive due process seems
extraordinary and unnecessary This Comment will explain that
although due process considerations and the requirement of
effective counsel form an adequate basis for the court's decision, a
shift in emphasis from substantive to procedural due process would
have strengthened the holding. In support of this conclusion, the
discussion will focus on the role of plea bargaining as P
bureaucratic, administrative process in the criminal justice system
and the need for an orderly, regular procedure in plea negotiations.
The limited utility of the contract analogy in meeting this need,
the establishment of the fairness concept in Santobello v. New
York, 7 and the importance of the defense attorney in the plea
bargain process indicate that specific performance may be
necessary in some situations to ensure the integrity of this process.
the United States Attorney.
This conversation took place at approximately 11:00 A.m. By noon, Cooper had agreed to
the proposal and his attorney attempted to contact the assistant prosecutor. Contact was not
made until midafternoon, however, when the assistant prosecutor informed defense counsel
that the proposal had been withdrawn because the United States Attorney disapproved. De-
fense counsel never had the opportunity to accept the proposal on behalf of his client. Id. at
15.
Significantly, Cooper did not hesitate to accept the proposal and his attorney exercised
utmost diligence in communicating prompt acceptance. In addition, the short time span
between the proposal and its withdrawal refutes any argument that Cooper could have
changed his position in reliance upon the agreement.
6. Id. at 18.
7. 404 U.S. 257 (1972).
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CONTRACT ANALOGY IN PLEA BARGAIN DECISIONS
By 1967 an estimated ninety percent of all criminal cases
nationwide were disposed of through pretrial procedures.' Not until
1970, however, did the Supreme Court tacitly approve the practice
of negotiating guilty pleas in exchange for benefits offered by the
state.' A mere two years later, the Court recognized plea bargaining
as "an essential component of the administration of justice."'0 In
1974 the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure finally were
amended to reflect the presence of plea bargaining within the
federal criminal justice system." Against this background of a
slowly developing law of plea bargain administration, courts
turned consistently to the well-established common law principles
of contract law for guidance because the very terms "plea bargain"
and "plea negotiation" suggested a business transaction.
The Supreme Court and the lower courts have used contract
terminology in plea bargain cases, basing decisions on offer,
acceptance, performance, breach of performance, and even the
parol evidence rule. 2 Relief, when granted, often has consisted of
rescission or specific enforcement.'" Indeed, one recent article noted
in Cooper persuasively discusses the remedies for broken plea
bargain in terms of "a constitutional requirement that the
8. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOATS, REPORT ON
COURTS 15 (1973) (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 262-63 (1967)).
9. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady, the Court stated, "[W]e cannot
hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn
extends a substantial benefit to the State." Id. at 753. Tins case finally distinguished coer-
cive inducements from mutually agreeable bargains, thus moving plea bargaining beyond
the requirements of Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), that confessions be free and
voluntary, and those of Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927), that guilty pleas be
made voluntarily and with an understanding of the consequences. Under Brady, guilty pleas
that result from plea negotiations must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and with an un-
derstanding of the consequences. 397 U.S. at 748.
10. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 260.
ii. See FED. R. CRIM. P 1i(e)(1) (1974) (providing for the attorneys' meeting to discuss a
plea agreement); FED. R. CRIM. P li(e)(2) (1979) (providing for the judge's open acceptance
or rejection of the plea bargain).
12. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.6 (1977) (parol evidence rule);
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262-63 (inducement, consideration, breach, and specific
performance); United States ex rel Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1977)
(performance and benefit of the bargain); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 950 (lst
Cir. 1973) (specific performance).
13. See note 12 supra.
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contractual expectatins the state creates in criminal defendants
be protected."14 The analysis in Cooper, however, represents an
important step beyond the traditional contractual mode of analysis
for plea bargain controversies.
Beyond Contract Analogy
The district court rejected Cooper's motion for specific
enforcement of the plea bargain proposal because under contract
analysis, neither a contractual relationship creating rights and
obligations nor conduct by the prosecution creating promissory
estoppel on the basis of reliance were present." The Fourth Circuit
considered that analysis, although contractually sound, to be
misplaced, because "the temptation to take the relative certainties
of established common law analysis too far in developing difficult
constitutional doctrine is ever present and ever to be resisted."' 8
The rights of a participant in a plea negotiation, the court
observed, are derived not from contract principles, but from a
justifiable expectation that he will be treated with fairness. 7 Citing
Santobello v. New York, the court noted that "the core concept
here is the existence of a constitutional right in the defendant to be
treated with 'fairness' throughout the process."'" The government
had a "fundamental duty to negotiate with scrupulous fairness,"
and that duty was breached by the withdrawal of a reasonable,
specific, unambiguous plea proposal." Because contract law would
not hold the government to the same high standards, analysis
based on contract law was of limited utility
A major problem with contractual analysis of plea negotiations is
that although contract law may strive to create "minimally fair
dealing in the market place," 0 fairness is not its only concern.
14. Westen & Westin, supra note 2, at 473 (emphasis original).
15. 594 F.2d at 16 n.5.
16. Td. at 17 (footnotes omitted). Despite this explicit rejection of "common law analysis,"
one district court, citing Santobello and Cooper, recently used contractual analysis to find
offer, acceptance, and binding agreement in a case posing problems similar to those raised in
Cooper See United States v. Hubbard, No. 78-401 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 1979).
17. 594 F.2d at 16-17.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 17. This concern for minimal standards rather than absolute fairness reflects
Professor Fuller's opinion that law is closely related to the morality of duty: "[T]he morality
of duty starts at the bottom. It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is
[Vol. 21:521
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Many elements of contract law are designed simply to achieve the
pragmatic ends of certainty and order in complicated commercial
transactions. These ends often are achieved by the application of
mechanical rules or even by the outcome of fortuitous circum-
stances.21 As the court cautioned, however, "constitutional de-
cisions cannot be made to turn in favor of the government on the
fortuities of communications or on a refusal to accord any
substantive value to reasonably induced expectations that
government will honor its firmly advanced proposals."
The Fourth Circuit determined that contract law provided a
useful and fairly reliable "inclusive test"s for the constitutionality
of government action in plea negotiations, but not an "exclusive
test." 1 2 Actions that contract law principles would hold unfair
almost certainly would fall within the range of constitutionally
unacceptable plea bargain practices.2 On the other hand, actions
that contract law would countenance under its standard of
"minimally fair dealing," such as the withdrawal of an offer before
it is accepted, would not always meet the standards of
constitutional fairness. 2 Thus, contract law does not provide an
"exclusive test" in determining the existence of rights within the
plea bargaining process; " that determination must depend on
concepts of fairness.
Fairness as a Core Concept
The court in Cooper justified its decision by invoking "the right
to fundamental fairness embraced within due process guaran-
impossible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must
fail of its mark." L. FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAW 5-6 (1964).
21. For example, the "mailbox rule" of contract law provides that although an offer is not
made until the offeree receives it, an acceptance is binding as soon as the offeree entrusts it
to the mails. The rationale for this mechanical rule is that "[o]ne of the parties must carry
the risk of loss and inconvemence. We need a definite and uniform rule as to this. We can
choose either rule; but we must choose one. We can put the risk on either party; but we
must not leave it in doubt." 1 A. ConIN, CoNTAcTs § 78 (1963).




26. An offeror usually may revoke the offer at any time before it is accepted without incur-
ring liability. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 21, § 38.
27. 594 F.2d at 17.
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tees," 21 part of the "general constitutional framework of substan-
tive due process. ' 29 The court's concern with the elusive concept
of fairness was based upon its interpretation of Santobello v. New
York.30 In Santobello, the defendant was arrested for two felony
counts of gambling activities. He agreed to plead guilty to one
lesser included offense, provided that the government would make
no sentencing recommendations. After entry of the guilty plea
and before sentencing, Santobello changed counsel and moved
to suppress evidence, to inspect the grand jury minutes, and to
withdraw the guilty plea. The motions were denied and sentencing
followed several weeks later.
At sentencing, a prosecutor who had not been involved in the
original negotiations recommended the maximum sentence per-
mitted by law Nothing in the record had revealed the existence
of a bargain concerning sentencing recommendations and the trial
judge noted that Santobello's record would have indicated the
maximum sentence regardless of the recommendation. The de-
fendant unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence in the
New York courts and eventually sought and received certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decision focused on the administrative
aspects of plea bargaining, noting that plea bargaining should be
encouraged when "[p]roperly administered," 3' but openly criti-
cizing the record in Santobello as "another example of an un-
fortunate lapse in orderly prosecutorial procedures. 32 The Court
also stated that the considerations justifying the recognition of
plea bargaining "presuppose fairness in securing agreement be-
tween an accused and a prosecutor. '33 The decision thus implicitly
distinguished the process of negotiation from the implementation
of the results, but nevertheless required fairness in both parts of
the process. This distinction was emphasized further when the
Court noted that "ft]hs phase of the process of criminal justice,
and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty,
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 19.
30. For a thorough discussion of Santobello, see Westen & Westin, supra note 2. See also
Fischer, Beyond Santobello-Remedies for Reneged Plea Bargains, 2 U. SAN. FERN. V.L.
REV. 121 (1973).
31. 404 U.S. at 260.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 261 (emphasis supplied).
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must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is
reasonably due in the circumstances. ' 34
The Supreme Court thus identified two distinct aspects of the
plea bargain: the administrative aspect, which includes the
negotiations; and the adjudicative aspect, which includes the entry
and acceptance of the guilty plea. Constitutional safeguards,
however, attach to both. Although this due process requirement
was not explained fully, proper administration and orderly
procedures clearly require, at a minimum, "that when a plea rests
in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."-" Specifically, in
Santobello, the Court could not excuse the breach of an agreement
merely because it was the unintentional result of poor intraoffice
communications.36
Although these considerations enabled the Court to grant relief,
it remanded the final disposition of the case to the state court,
which better could decide whether the circumstances of the case
required "specific performance of the agreement on the plea, '37 or
whether the petitioner should be granted permission to withdraw
his plea. This disposition of the case created a confusing
precedent." Due process and fairness clearly require relief for
breach of a specific promise made to a defendant who has relied
upon that promise; the parameters of the Court's decision,
however, were undefined. Questions concerning the application of
specific performance as a remedy, especially under circumstances
that indicate no gross unfairness to defendant, and the extent to
which the Court's decision was based on an assumption that the
defendant was injured, remain unanswered. The Santobello
decision alone therefore provides an inadequate explanation of the
34. Id. at 262 (emphasis supplied).
35. Id. Whether this statement limits further application of the holding to instances m
which a guilty plea has been entered or merely demonstrates one part of the Court's larger
concern for the fair administration of plea bargains is unclear.
36. "The staff lawyers in a prosecutor's office have the burden of 'letting the left hand
know what the right hand is doing' or has done. That the breach was inadvertent does not
lessen its impact." Id.
37. Id. at 263.
38. See Westen & Westin, supra note 2, at 476. Also, the Court did not address in
Santobello whether the enforcement of plea bargain agreements is constitutionally required.
See 23 WAYNE L. Rav. 1129, 1141 n.l1 (1977).
1979]
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fairness concept upon which the Fourth Circuit based its decision
in Cooper The concern for fair treatment and orderly process can
be explained only within a larger framework of the development of
due process.
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Constitutional scholars have characterized the judicial devel-
opment of due process, as guaranteed by the fifth"9 and four-
teenth 0 amendments of the Constitution, as "an evolving process
punctuated by vague generalizations and declarations of broad,
overarching principles."'" The references in Cooper to "fairness"
and "substantive due process" fit this description well.4" Neither
the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights explicitly addresses the
court's concern that a defendant in a plea negotiation be treated
fairly or that the government keep its word once given; therefore,
these constitutional rights must have as their source something
other than a direct textual reference.4 3
Due process provides protection for those substantive or natural
rights to which everyone is entitled.4 This concept evolved from
39. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. " U.S. CONST. amend. V
40. "No State shall ..deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law. " U.S. CONST. amend. IV
41. L. TaBmE, AMERICAN CONsTrurIoNAL LAw 506 (1978) (footnote omitted).
42. The court of appeals created a near tautology by referring to "the right to fundamen-
tal fairness embraced within substantive due process guarantees." 594 F.2d at 18. Defining
"fairness" in terms of "due process" accomplishes little. Unfortunately, a court rarely clan-
fies these principles when it bases its decision on considerations of "fairness."
"Fairness" generally denotes one of three concepts: that the outcome of a case is appropri-
ate to the circumstances; that like persons in like circumstances will be treated equally; or
that the court will use regular, orderly, and nonarbitrary procedures in decision making and
outcome determination. See Casper, Having Their Day in Court: Defendant Evaluations of
the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAw & Soc'y REv. 237 (1978). The interest in fairness
represented by Cooper tends more toward the third alternative, though these categories are
not mutually exclusive.
43. One article notes that Santobello must have been constitutionally based, because the
Court did not identify the federal statute that conferred jurisdiction to review the state court
conviction. The authors therefore concluded that jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1970), which provides for review of final state court judgments only if constitutional rights
are asserted. Westen & Westin, supra note 2, at 476 n.16.
44. J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTrrurIoNAL LAw 385 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as J. NOwAK]. The concept of "due process" presents the same definitional
problems as "fairness," see note 42 supra, as when due process is linked to "fundamental
fairness," the deprivation of which is "shocking to the umversal sense of justice." Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
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seventeenth and eighteenth century political thought that
determined that "a higher or natural law limited the restrictions on
liberty that a temporal government could impose on an
individual."45 Typical of this concern for a "higher law" was
Justice Frankfurter's description of due process as embodying "a
system of rights based on moral principles so deeply embedded in
the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole
history "46
Substantive due process seeks to protect those "individual rights
which do not have a specific textual base in the Constitution or its
Amendments." 7 Because it protects those rights by imposing
constraints upon the exercise of power" it may be a positive agent
within constitutional law that is manifested only negatively Thus,
due process requires the following: that a prisoner not be coerced to
confess" or to enter a guilty plea;"0 that a defendant not be
convicted without the aid of counsel; 1 that a defendant not be
convicted on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt" or
through the use of false evidence;" and that a waiver of
constitutional rights not be accepted unless made voluntarily and'
knowingly 54 The constraining nature of due process has had an
important influence on the development of plea bargaining. In
particular, the due process guarantees associated with guilty pleas
have provided foundation for judicial analysis of plea bargains.
When pretrial negotiations lead to the entry of a guilty plea in
court, the plea is not only an admission of guilt but also a waiver of
important constitutional rights. A guilty plea constitutes "waiver
of the fundamental rights to a jury trial, to confront one's accusers,
45. J. NowAx, supra note 44, at 385.
46. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47. J. NowAx, supra note 44, at 417-18.
48. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).
49. Chambers v. Flonda, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
50. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
51. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in any case in which im-
pnsonment is imposed); Gideon v. Wainnght, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel m state
felony cases); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to appointed counsel in state
capital cases). This progression demonstrates the increased concern for due process safe-
guards that has characterized constitutional criminal procedure in the last half-century.
52. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
53. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
54. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel); Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (guilty pleas).
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to present witnesses in one's defense, to remain silent, and to be
convicted beyond all reasonable doubt."55 Thus, substantial
safeguards must accompany the entry of a guilty plea in order to
ensure against the unjust denial of the defendant's rights.
The safeguards are concerned primarily with the defendant's
state of mind when he enters the plea.56 Regardless of whether the
defendant enters the plea as part of a plea bargain, he must reach
his decision voluntarily,57 knowingly,58 and with full understanding
of the consequences59 and alternatives."0 An affirmative showing on
55. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
56. Most procedural rights, after all, are designed to protect innocent defendants
from being falsely convicted. Accordingly, whenever the state allows a defen-
dant to waive all his procedural rights by pleading guilty, it runs the risk that
an innocent defendant will be falsely convicted. With respect to spontaneous or
noninduced pleas, the risk can be minimized by requiring the prosecution to
present a "factual basis" for the plea and by relying on the defendant to look to
his own self interest to avoid false self-condemnation. With induced or negoti-
ated pleas, on the other hand, the factual basis requirement and the defen-
dant's self interest both become less reliable, because if an inducement to
plead guilty is attractive enough even an innocent defendant may perceive it to
be m his self interest to make a false confession of guilt.
Westen & Westin, supra note 2, at 497 (footnotes omitted). Thus, safeguards are intended to
prevent a guilty plea when the defendant does not believe that the plea is in his best inter-
est, or when the inducement to plead guilty seems sufficiently attractive to warrant pleading
guilty to avoid the travails of a trial even though the defendant is not guilty
The high "implicit race of non-conviction" that accompanies an increase in plea bargain
activity demonstrates the need to protect defendants from themselves. See Finkelstein, A
Statistical Analysts of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARv. L. REv. 293, 295
(1975). Finkelstein studied conviction rates in 29 federal districts during 1970-74 and esti-
mated that as many as 69% of those who plead guilty under marginal circumstances would
be acquitted at trial, with an estimated average of 51%. Id. at 308.
57. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Waley v. Johnston, 316
U.S. 101, 104 (1942); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
58. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748 (holding that guilty plea as a waiver of consti-
tutional rights "must be [a] knowing, intelligent [act] done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences"); see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637
(1976) (holding that guilty plea cannot be voluntary when not intelligently made).
59. But see United States v. Timmreck, 99 S. Ct. 2085 (1979), in which the Supreme
Court held that failure to apprise the defendant of a special mandatory parole term required
for certain narcotics offenses will not invalidate the plea unless the defendant can show ac-
tual prejudice.
60. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (concluding that defendant must be aware
of defenses in order to plea intelligently); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160 (1957) (hold-
mg guilty plea invalid when unrepresented defendant could not have understood technically
difficult defenses).
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the record," including direct questiomng of the defendant," must
establish the fulfillment of these requirements. In federal courts,
the judge also must indicate the factual basis for the plea on the
record." The requirements that vindictiveness play no part in the
prosecutor's actions64 and that promises or agreements made by the
prosecution to induce guilty pleas be fulfilled65 complete the due
process requirements for plea bargaining as established by the
Supreme Court.
The lower courts gradually have shaped the skeletal guidelines
provided by the Supreme Court and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, although the results have not been uniform. The lower
courts have established that the plea agreements of a federal or
state prosecutor in one district may bind his counterparts
elsewhere,6 but a prosecutor's promises do not bind a judge."
Moreover, although a prosecutor's statements to a defendant about
the likelihood of his receiving a prison sentence may constitute
promises, 8 a judge's comments under similar circumstances may
not." Furthermore, a halfhearted sentence recommendation may
not fulfill a plea bargain in one circuit," whereas in another, that
recommendation would qualify as adequate performance.7 1 Of
particular relevance to Cooper are those cases dealing with the
specific enforcement of "unfulfillable promises."
Specific Enforcement of the Unfulfillable Promise
The Supreme Court noted in Brady v. United States7 that a
guilty plea may be invalid on the basis of the due process
61. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
62. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464-65 (1969).
63. FED. R. CRIM. P 11(f), (g) (1974).
64. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1978). Nor may such a motivation play
a role in a judge's actions. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969).
65. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972). See also text
accompanying note 79 infra.
67. United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975).
68. Id. at 330-31.
69. United States ex reL Selikoff v. Commissioner of Corrections, 524 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denmed, 425 U.S. 951 (1976). The judge was precluded by statute from making
any unconditional promises at the time the guilty plea was entered.
70. United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1974).
71. Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d 705, 714-16 (2d Cir. 1977).
72. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
19791
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voluntariness requirement if the prosecution induced the plea by
misrepresentations including unfulfillable promises.73 Generally, a
promise is unfulfillable if its fulfillment would be contrary to law'7
if the promisor does not have the authority or power necessary to
ensure fulfillment,75 or if the promise would not produce the
anticipated results even if fulfilled.76 In Cooper, the promise
became unfulfillable because the assistant prosecutor allegedly
lacked the authority to make it. Thus, prior decisions support the
substantive due process aspects of the result in Cooper
The Fourth Circuit first addressed an unfulfillable plea bargain
promise in Unted States v. Carter 77 The defendant Carter had
pleaded guilty to a stolen check charge in the District of Columbia
after allegedly receiving promises from the Assistant United States
Attorney that he would not be prosecuted for any crimes divulged
if he cooperated in the apprehension and conviction of other
suspects and pleaded guilty to a single charge. Carter later was
indicted and convicted in Virginia on charges that arose, in part,
from the same activities covered by the District of Columbia
prosecution. He appealed, assigning as error the district court's
demal of his motion to dismiss the indictments. The Fourth Circuit
held that Carter was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to
determine the truth of his allegations with dismissal of the
indictments as a possible outcome.
The court cited United States v. Pawia,7 a decision by the
District Court for the District of Columbia, as support for the
proposition that if a defendant relies on prosecutorial promises to
his prejudice, then a promise not to indict on other charges must
be honored. This promise also requires curtailing the right to
prosecute in other judicial districts:
The United States government is the United States government
throughout all of the states and districts. If the United States
73. Id. at 755.
74. Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973) (statute required imposition of
sentence of mimmum length).
75. In re Geiser, 554 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1977) (attempt to bind State Department to
course of action on extradition request); Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976)
(promise to arrange parole).
76. Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 948. In Correale, any sentence would have pre-
vented the denied result of concurrent federal parole eligibility.
77. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
78. 294 F Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969).
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government in the District of Columbia, acting through one of
its apparently authorized agents, promised that the sole
prosecution against the defendant would be the misdemeanor
charge in that jurisdiction, and defendant relied on the promise
to his prejudice we will not permit the United States
government in the Eastern District of Virginia to breach the
promise."
Although the court in Carter emphasized the defendant's reliance
on the promise as a basis for its decision, the holding established
an important precedent: under appropriate circumstances, an
assistant prosecutor may commit the government to a course of
action regardless of his authority to do so. Furthermore, the court
stressed that possible prejudice to the government's best interests
in a case would not allow a result unjust to the defendant. The
court stated:
If there be fear that an United States Attorney may
unreasonably bargain away the government's right and duty to
prosecute, the solution lies m the administrative controls which
the Attorney General of the United States may promulgate to
regulate and control the conduct of cases, by the United States
Attorneys and their assistants."0
Thus, in 1972 the Fourth Circuit adumbrated the concern shown
in Cooper for proper administration of plea negotiations."' Although
the court did not discuss due process explicitly, the decision
reflects a basic concern for fairness that extends beyond the
interests of a particular defendant. The court was concerned with
"the honor of the government[,] public confidence in the fair
administration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice
79. 454 F.2d at 428.
80. Id.
81. The court in Cooper offered the following suggestions as to how the United States
Attorney could establish an appropriate procedure:
Once plea discussions are underway, it clearly lies with these agencies of gov-
ernment, among other things, to keep the left hand informed of the right's do-
mg; to withhold or limit the actual, and circumscribe the apparent, authority
of subordinates if this be considered necessary; to incorporate reservations re-
lating to higher level approval routinely in all proposals or specially m some;
and, if thought necessary, to protect against perjured testimony of the making
and acceptance of proposals by routine requirements of signed memoranda.
594 F.2d at 20 (footnote omitted).
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in a federal scheme of government," 2 the same concerns that per-
meated Cooper
The second Fourth Circuit unfulfillable bargain case, United
States v. Hammerman," involved a defendant who had cooperated
in the investigation that eventually led to the prosecution of Spiro
Agnew The defendant had pleaded guilty to obstruction of the
enforcement of tax laws after receiving assurances from an
assistant prosecutor that the court had indicated a willingness to
follow prosecution recommendations that Hammerman not receive
a prison sentence." The court noted that although the assurances
were merely predictions,"5 they were "likely to inculcate belief and
reliance," and therefore constituted an important part of the plea
agreement. 6 The prosecution had no power to implement such
assurances; thus, they were unfulfillable promises87 and the
defendant was entitled to relief.
The court decided that the proper remedy under the
circumstances was to allow Hammerman to withdraw his guilty
plea.8 It distinguished those cases in which the prosecution offered
a bargain normally within its power to fulfill, as in Carter, from the
circumstances presented in Hammerman in which the defendant
was given no assurances that the prosecution would fulfill the
bargain.
That an assistant prosecutor may bind the prosecutorial forces of
'the United States to a specific sentence but cannot bind a court in
the same way seems inconsistent; this distinction, however, is
supported by other courts 9 and reflects a general respect for the
exclusive power of the court to impose sentences. In addition,
82. 454 F.2d at 428.
83. 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975).
84. Id. at 329-30.
85. Id. at 330, 330 n.12.
86. Id. at 330.
87. "It does not matter that the prediction or promise was made in good faith; what mat-
ters is it was probably relied upon, was not fulfilled and was unfulfillable." Id. at 331; see
Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d at 947 ("Prosecutorial misrepresentations, though made
in good faith, even to obtain a just, and here a mutually desired end, are not acceptable.").
88. "[T]he district court promised Hammerman nothing. There is thus no bargain which
can be enforced." 528 F.2d at 322; cf. Gallejors v. United States, 466 F.2d 740, 741 (5th Cir.
1972) (holding that the bargain is "either specifically enforceable between the parties or the
plea is void").
89. See, e.g., Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976) (sentencing is totally
within the court's discretion).
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defense lawyers are aware that prosecutors cannot commit a judge
to a specific sentence, although a pledge not to prosecute generally
is within the power of the prosecutor. Thus, the nature of the un-
fulfillable promise is a basis 6n which to judge the reasonableness
of the expectation created by the defendant, which in turn affects
the remedy to be awarded.
Carter and Hammerman provide the substantive principles that
directed the outcome in Cooper If a prosecutor makes a promise
that is normally within the range of prosecutorial discretion, than
that promise must be honored, even if it later proves to be an
unfulfillable promise because it exceeded the prosecutor's powers.
Alternatively, if a plea is induced by a promise not within the
usual powers of the prosecution, the court may invalidate the plea,
but specific enforcement is not required."
The decision in Cooper followed the above analysis and protected
both the defendant's substantive right to enter a guilty plea
voluntarily and intelligently9' and the right to receive fair
treatment.9 2 The assistant prosecutor's proposal required Cooper's
cooperation as a witness in ongoing narcotics trials and entry of a
guilty plea to one count of obstruction of justice in exchange for the
dismissal of other counts and favorable recommendations to the
judge at sentencing. This proposal was unambiguous and
reasonable, and the attorney who made the offer conveyed no
reservations as to the proposal's acceptability Furthermore, the
proposal promised only actions normally within the discretion of
the prosecution.
Under these circumstances, specific enforcement of the proposal
might have been appropriate, except that the absence of the
reliance element emphasized in Hammerman and Carter would
seem to have precluded this form of relief. Furthermore, although
the Fourth Circuit ascertained that Hammerman's due process
rights were protected adequately by allowing him to withdraw his
guilty plea, it granted more drastic relief to Cooper, who had not
90. The result might have been different in Hammerman had the defendant changed his
position materially and unalterably. In Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976), for
example, a prosecutor's promise regarding parole, not within hns power to fulfill, was specifi-
cally enforced because the defendant had been serving a prison sentence that already had
extended beyond the entire promised sentence and parole.
91. See notes 56-60 supra & accompanying text.
92. See notes 17-19 & 31-33 supra & accompanying text.
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changed his position to his prejudice. Principles of substantive due
process therefore do not explain fully the decision in Cooper; the
court should have based its decision on the defendant's procedural
due process rights.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
Procedural due process" safeguards the rights and interests of
parties affected by governmental action outside of the courtroom
and whenever abbreviated judicial processes are used. In such
instances, due process consists primarily of the requirements of
adequate notice94 and a proper hearing, 5 founded on the basic
principle that when life, liberty, or property is at stake, the
individual is entitled to a regular, orderly, and nonarbitrary pro-
cess." Although courts formerly distinguished between privileges
benefits extended at the government's discretion, and rights,
which merited greater protection because they did not depend
on government largesse,97 this distinction has disappeared in the
last ten years. 8 Procedural due process now dictates that when-
93. Procedural due process differs from substantive due process in that the former ensures
only the "fairness" of the decision-making process; the latter guarantees the quality of the
court's decision. Procedural due process therefore measures the third definition of "fairness,"
see note 42 supra, which requires regular, orderly, and nonarbitrary procedures.
One commentator, in developing a concept of "process values," suggested that "procedu-
ral rationality, humanity, and regard for dignity and privacy" are valuable in themselves
without regard for the results of the process. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal
Processes-A Plea for "Process Values", 60 CORNmL L. RaV. 1, 2 (1974). Concern for "hu-
manity" and "dignity" within plea bargaining procedures might support the development of
"procedural rationality," including notice; a fair hearing; published, understandable, and
noncontradictory rules; constancy through time; and congruence between the announced
rules and their administration. See L. FULLER, supra note 20, at 39. Accordingly, the decision
in Cooper might reflect the court's unarticulated, heightened concern for "process values."
94. See, e.g., Smadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (requiring notice in Wis-
consin prejudgment garnishment of wages); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208
(1962) (requiring notice in condemnation proceedings).
95. See, e.g, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring a hearing prior to termina-
tion of welfare benefits); Smadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (requiring a
hearing under Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment of wages).
96. J. NowAK, supra note 44, at 477.
97. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 207 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
98. See Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property"- Adjudicative Due Process in the
Admimstrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAnv. L. Rzv. 1439 (1968). See generally
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245
(1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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ever the government extends a benefit, orderly procedures must
be followed before that benefit is withdrawn.99
The courts already have applied this concept to criminal
procedure by mandating a hearing prior to the revocation of
parole 0° or probation."°' In Morrissey v. Brewer,10 which extended
due process to the parole revocation process, the Supreme Court
noted that although the parolee's liberty was only a qualified
liberty, it nevertheless
includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a "grievous loss" on the parolee and often on
others. It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this
problem in terms of whether the parolee's liberty is a "right" or
a "privilege." By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and
must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process,
however informal.0 3
This same liberty value demands protection in plea bargain
negotiations. ' Although parole revocation affects a government
benefit previously extended and although plea negotiations are
prospective in effect, plea bargaining so profoundly affects the
liberty interests of criminal defendants that its administration also
"calls for some orderly process." ' Despite the absence of a
constitutional right to plea bargain"' and the availability of full
constitutional protection at trial, the realities of the criminal
justice system dictate more orderly procedures in plea bargaining.
Plea bargaining is not merely a part of the criminal justice
system; for the overwhelming majority of defendants, it is the
criminal justice system. As noted earlier, an estimated ninety
99. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). The Court noted, "[This Court has
now rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental bene-
fit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Id.
100. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
101. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
102. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
103. Id. at 482.
104. "The essential guarantee of the due process clause is that the government may not
imprison or otherwise physically restrain a person except m accordance with fair proce-
dures." J. Now ,, supra note 44, at 483.
105. 408 U.S. at 482. Regularity in procedures is preferable, because irregularity often be-
comes oppressive. L. TRIBE, supra note 41, at 475.
106. Weathefford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977).
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percent of all criminal cases are disposed of through pretrial
negotiations.107 The adversary model of criminal adjudication no
longer is an accurate reflection of the movement of a defendant
through the criminal justice system.0 " Justice is dispensed infor-
mally in five- and ten-minutes negotiations" 9 under circum-
stances m which the opportunity for abuse of prosecutorial discre-
tion is great.
Plea bargaining offers direct, tangible, and important benefits to
defendants and the government." 0 If the Supreme Court mandates
safeguards for the liberty interests of those already convicted, a
logical, necessary step would extend procedural safeguards to the
process through wuch most defendants are convicted. Although a
defendant has no right to demand the opportunity to negotiate a
favorable plea agreement, once the government begins such
negotiations, the demise of the right-privilege distinction should
require that the defendant's interests be protected rigorously as if
plea bargaining were an enforceable right.
Within the context of procedural due process, the decision in
Cooper represents the imposition of order and fairness on a process
too often beset by unbridled discretion. To accomplish this
objective, specific performance of the agreement was necessary; no
other remedy would have forced the district attorney to institute
and follow orderly procedures. If the courts imposed no sanctions
for disorderly negotiation procedures before entry of a guilty plea,
107. NATIONAL ADvisoaY COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REPORT OF
COURTS 15 (1973).
108. Id.
109. See 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 693, 697 (1977).
110. The benefits of plea bargaining to the government are obvious. Plea bargaining
reduces the caseload in already overburdened courts and leads to a reasonably prompt dispo-
sition of cases. In addition, some defendants who were guilty but who would have been
acquitted at trial because of weaknesses in the government's case arguably will be drawn
within the corrections system.
The benefits to the defendants are more difficult to define. Although an average plea nego-
tiation may reduce the original charge by two "steps," see id. at 700, prosecutors may "over-
charge" originally in order to enhance their bargaining positions. One recent study, however,
found a strong correlation between the method of conviction and the type and length of
sentence received. Those who were convicted by jury trial were much more likely to receive
prison sentences and were likely to draw longer terms. Although other factors were consid-
ered in the analysis, the researchers maintained that the method of conviction was a siguifi-
cant predictor of sentencing practices. UTILIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROJECT,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VARIATIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCES 9-11 (1978). These results
suggest that plea bargaining offers benefits to both sides of the bargain.
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the process of negotiation would remain beyond the reach of
judicial supervision except for the most outrageous abuses.," That
result would contravene the interest of the courts in achieving and
maintaining proper administration of the plea bargaining process.
The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The sixth amendment1 guarantee of the right to counsel also
supports the Cooper decision, especially in light of the requirement
in Cooper of standardization of the plea negotiation process.
Defense counsel must be included within the negotiating process
unless the defendant is proceeding pro se,115 and his participation
must be effective."' Because a guilty plea must be made
voluntarily, knowingly, and with full understanding of the
consequences, the assistance of an attorney is invaluable.1"
Although a defendant may plead guilty without the advice of an
attorney, such pleas often are subject to collateral attack1 because
an unrepresented defendant generally cannot understand the
complexities of the criminal process. 7
The negotiations in Cooper did not result in a guilty plea,
however, and the question of the defendant's right to counsel
during plea bargaining remains unanswered. The Supreme Court
has established that a person has the right to counsel during
any "'critical stage" ' in the process of criminal adjudication.
Thus, once the suspect becomes the focus of a police investigation
that results in an interrogation,1 preliminary hearing,"' or
111. For example, a prosecutor might make a defendant an offer that was simply too good
to be true, thereby offering a coercive inducement.
112. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
113. FED. R. CuM. P li(e)(1) (1974).
114. See notes 121-29 infra & accompanying text.
115. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (assistance of counsel necessary to
understand defenses and plead intelligently); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (assis-
tance of counsel necessary to understand technical defenses to murder charge); Pennsylvania
ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956) (assistance of counsel necessary to understand
numerous, complex charges); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (assistance of
counsel necessary for young, inexperienced defendant).
116. Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213 (1973).
117. See note 114 supra. If a defendant does not understand the charges against him or
the defenses available to him, he cannot enter a guilty plea intelligently; thus, his plea is
invalid.
118. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).
119. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
120. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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arraignment,"' the right to counsel attaches. Because plea
bargaining does not take place until a defendant is well within the
criminal justice system, such negotiations must be recognized as a
"critical stage" requiring the presence and assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this point, but clearly
has recogmzed "the importance of counsel during plea
negotiations."' 2
The mere presence of counsel, however, is insufficient to ensure
the fairness of proceedings; counsel must render effective
assistance.lri A precise definition of the effective assistance
standard is difficult to articulate because the Supreme Court has
required only that counsel provide advice "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,' '2 4 and has
left the determination of that range to "the good sense and
discretion of the trial courts."'2 The Fourth Circuit, in Coles v.
Peyton,'12 suggested the following standards for evaluating the
assistance of counsel:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed
promptly Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer with his
client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise
him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain
that potential defenses are available. Counsel must conduct
appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine
if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself
enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.'2
The standards of Coles, applied to plea negotiations, would
suggest that the attorney must be present at the initiation of
plea negotiations in order to advise the defendant effectively
throughout the proceedings. The following should be included in
the attorney's duties: a review of the alleged facts of the crime to
determine whether the criminal charges were supported; a
121. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
122. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978). See also Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
123. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
124. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
125. Id.
126. 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968).
127. Id. at 226 (footnote omitted). These standards were followed in Marzullo v. Mary-
land, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977).
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balancing of possible defenses against the strength of the
prosecution's evidence; a consideration of the possible hazards or
detriments in proceeding to trial; and a further balancing of the
defendant's personal wishes and interests against the value of the
offered benefit.' The complexity of these considerations and the
necessity of arriving at a fair agreement dictate that the relation-
ship of attorney, client, and prosecution be free of suspicious
behavior by the government.
The defense attorney serves as both counselor and medium12
through which the government communicates with the defendant,
and therefore plays an extremely sensitive role. The mere
appearance of confusion in plea negotiations could influence
strongly a defendant's perception of the quality of assistance
rendered and thus adversely affect the efficacy of the assistance of
counsel. As noted in Cooper, the rapid proposal and withdrawal of
a plea agreement could call into question "counsel's capability and
professional responsibility, as well as the government's
reliability "I" Under such circumstances, a defendant might
consider the entire adjudicatory process a sham and make a
decision that would be neither well advised nor truly voluntary
The decision in Cooper thus stands as a defense to possible
governmental manipulation of the attorney-client relationship and
serves notice that the court will require the utmost circumspection
in prosecutorial negotiations with defendants and their attorneys.'
Specific enforcement of the plea proposal is the best means of
accomplishing the goal of regularizing the negotiation process and
protecting a defendant's sixth amendment rights.
128. See Lorraine v. Gladden, 261 F Supp. 909, 911 (D. Ore. 1966) (setting aside a plea of
guilty, waiver or indictment, and sentences):
The appointment of counsel after the successful negotiation of the guilty plea
and minutes before its entry was ineffective, and did not give petitioner the
representation required by the Constitution. Appointed counsel could not have
reviewed the facts of the crime, the possible defenses or the hazards of a trial,
nor could he have evaluated the bargain offered by the prosecutor. For all prac-
tical purposes, the petitioner entered his plea without advice of counsel.
Id.
129. Brewer v.Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977), quoted in Cooper v. United States, 594
F.2d at 18.
130. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d at 18.
131. The court in Cooper found "no suggestion of deliberate abuse," but noted that
"our failure to [recognize a] constitutional right and violation in this case would necessarily
give judicial approval to a practice whose possibilities for easy abuse, or at least the appear-
ance of abuse, are abundantly clear." Id. at 20.
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CONCLUSION
The negotiated guilty plea remains the keystone of the criminal
justice system; without plea bargaining, the system would collapse
under the weight of a tenfold increase in criminal trials. Despite
the importance of plea negotiations to the system, the prosecution,
and the defendant, the process through which an agreement is
reached in the past was left almost entirely to the discretion of
the prosecution. Courts and legislatures must recognize the need
for greater controls upon the administrative processes of the
negotiated plea.
In the absence of legislative action, the courts must take steps to
preserve a defendant's rights when he is confronted by the
byzantine workings of the criminal justice system. A defendant
may not have the right to demand that he be extended a favorable
plea bargain, but he does have the right to expect that the
prosecution will respect his constitutional rights when negotiations
have begun; the holding in Cooper is but one step to ensure the
protection of those rights.
Cooper v. United States is not a radical move; it simply assures
a defendant that a plea bargain is rendered enforceable by his
timely assent. The holding thus represents the continued
development of concern for a defendant's full panoply of
constitutional rights and ensures that the prosecution must honor
its "fundamental duty to negotiate with scrupulous fairness in
seeking guilty pleas.113 2
K. D N.
132. Id. at 19.
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